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ABSTRACT
Objective: One of the key goals of the current reforms
in the English National Health Service (NHS) under the
Health and Social Care Act, 2012, is to increase the
accountability of those responsible for commissioning
care for patients (clinical commissioning groups
(CCGs)), while at the same time allowing them a
greater autonomy. This study was set out to explore
CCG’s developing accountability relationships.
Design: We carried out detailed case studies in eight
CCGs, using interviews, observation and documentary
analysis to explore their multiple accountabilities.
Setting/participants: We interviewed 91 people,
including general practitioners, managers and
governing body members in developing CCGs, and
undertook 439 h of observation in a wide variety of
meetings.
Results: CCGs are subject to a managerial, sanction-
backed accountability to NHS England (the highest tier
in the new organisational hierarchy), alongside a
number of other external accountabilities to the public
and to some of the other new organisations created by
the reforms. In addition, unlike their predecessor
commissioning organisations, they are subject to
complex internal accountabilities to their members.
Conclusions: The accountability regime to which
CCGs are subject to is considerably more complex than
that which applied their predecessor organisations. It
remains to be seen whether the twin aspirations of
increased autonomy and increased accountability can
be realised in practice. However, this early study raises
some important issues and concerns, including the risk
that the different bodies to whom CCGs are accountable
will have differing (or conflicting) agendas, and the lack
of clarity over the operation of sanction regimes.
INTRODUCTION
‘The Government’s reforms will liberate pro-
fessionals and providers from top-down
control. This is the only way to secure the
quality, innovation and productivity needed
to improve the outcomes. We will give
responsibility for commissioning and
budgets to groups of general practitioner
(GP) practices; and providers will be freed
from government control to shape their ser-
vices around the needs and choices of
patients. A greater autonomy will be
matched by an increased accountability to
patients and democratic legitimacy, with a
transparent regime of economic regulation
and quality inspection to hold providers to
account for the results they deliver’.1
Having initially promised ‘no more top-down
reorganisations of the National Health
Service (NHS)’,2 the UK Coalition
Government elected in 2010 immediately
embarked on a radical overhaul of the NHS
in England (the NHSs in Wales, Scotland
and Northern Ireland are governed by the
devolved authorities), with a reorganisation
that affects most parts of the service. As this
quote suggests, the driving force behind the
reforms was a desire to ‘liberate’ profes-
sionals from top-down control, at the same
time as making them more accountable. In
brief, the changes maintain and extend the
notion of a ‘quasi-market’ in the NHS, ﬁrst
introduced in the 1990s.3 The overall respon-
sibility for running the NHS has been
removed from the department of health
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ The study took place in the early phases of CCG
establishment, and therefore provides a snapshot
of a developing situation.
▪ The study included detailed case studies in eight
sites across England, and so provides a robust
picture of clinical commissioning groups (CCGs)
developing accountability relationships.
▪ The triangulation of evidence from interviews,
document analysis and observation enhances the
trustworthiness of the findings.
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(DH) and handed to a new arm’s length body, NHS
England (NHSE).i The responsibility for commissioning
(purchasing) the majority of services for a deﬁned geo-
graphical population was historically held by primary
care trusts (PCTs). These organisations were manageri-
ally dominated, and were directly accountable to the DH
(ie, the health ministry). The Health and Social Care
Act (HSCA)4 abolished PCTs (from 1 April 2013),
passing responsibility for commissioning to primary care
physicians (GPs) working together in local clinical com-
missioning groups (CCGs). These groups were estab-
lished as statutory bodies from 1 April 2013, and are
now responsible for 65% of the overall budget of the
NHS, covering a deﬁned geographical area and commis-
sioning routine and emergency care. NHSE will oversee
CCGs, and will be responsible for commissioning some
services (eg, primary care, specialised services) at a
national level. Managerial budgets for CCGs will be sig-
niﬁcantly less than was the case for PCTs, and they will
be expected to ‘buy in’ managerial commissioning
support from standalone organisations, known as
‘Commissioning Support Units’ (CSUs).5 Further regula-
tion will be provided by Monitor, who is an arm’s length
government body originally established to regulate
quasi-independent NHS hospitals known as ‘Foundation
Trusts’.6 Monitor now has an expanded role as economic
regulator of the new NHS system, responsible for the
prevention of anticompetitive behaviour, the promotion
of integration, setting prices within the system and
ensuring service continuity. The responsibility for public
health is transferred to local government authorities
(LAs), and new LA subcommittees known as Health and
Well-being Boards (HWBs) have been created, charged
with setting the overarching strategic direction for
health and social care services across a geographical
area. CCGs will be members of these bodies, and will be
expected to set their own priorities in response to the
strategic direction set by their local HWBs.
Thus, the new system creates a number of new bodies
with signiﬁcant responsibilities, and redeﬁnes relation-
ships in signiﬁcant ways, with an associated increase in
complexity. This increase in complexity in part has come
about because of the continued commitment by the UK
government to the idea of a market in healthcare, a com-
mitment shared by other governments across the world.
However, markets require regulation, and recent scandals
in England (such as the recent signiﬁcant failings of care
at Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust (http://www.
midstaffspublicinquiry.com/)) have demonstrated just
how difﬁcult that regulation can be. One of the ofﬁcial
aspirations underpinning the creation of CCGs in
England (as demonstrated by the quotation opening this
article) is to enable greater accountability, and it is clear
from the brief description given above that the success of
the new system will, to some extent, depend on how suc-
cessfully the new accountability relationships are estab-
lished. However, in spite of very extensive documentation
issued to guide CCGs as they established themselves (see
http://www.england.nhs.uk/resources/resources-for-ccgs/,
accessed June 2013) the exact nature of CCG accountabil-
ity relationships remains ill-deﬁned and somewhat under-
speciﬁed. One of the key guidance documents issued to
CCGs was a guide to governance processes. Accountability
is thus referred to:
CCGs will have to account to the patients and population
they serve as well as being accountable to the NHS
Commissioning Board (NHSCB; NHSE). This will require a
comprehensive and effective patient and public engage-
ment strategy with systems and processes to assure the
governing body that this is taking place throughout the
organisation. They will need to play a full role on their
local HWBs including cooperating, preparing joint stra-
tegic needs assessments ( JSNAs) and agreeing a joint
Health and Wellbeing Strategy. They will also work in part-
nership with LAs and (as members of the HWBs) have a
role in encouraging health and social care commissioners
with the aim of securing better integrated health and
social care for their patients. They will have a responsibil-
ity to ensure that relevant health and care professionals are
involved in the design of services and that patients and the
public are actively involved in the commissioning arrange-
ments (ref. 7, p.4, emphasis added).
This paragraph summarises potential complexities
facing CCGs, referring to a number of different audi-
ences and stakeholders. However, it is silent about the
mechanics of the various accountability relationships,
and provides no advice as to how any conﬂicts between
them might be resolved.
This article uses evidence from a study of the early
development of CCGs to explore how claims to increased
accountability might play out in practice. We examine
CCG constitutional documents, interviews with CCG
leaders and observations of CCG meetings to explore
how CCGs are interpreting their accountabilities and
how the new system is developing in practice. Although it
is early days, and the full effect of the various accountabil-
ity relationships will not become clear for some time, we
believe that it is valuable to highlight developing com-
plexities and potential issues at this point.
What follows is divided into ﬁve sections. A short dis-
cussion of the relevant dimensions of ‘accountability’ is
followed by a more detailed account of the obligations
and roles given to CCGs under the HSCA 2012.4 A
description of our methods is followed by results and dis-
cussion, with a ﬁnal section summarising the implica-
tions of our ﬁndings.
Definitions of accountability
Mulgan8 describes accountability as a ‘complex and
chameleon-like term’ that has extended beyond an
iThis body was initially called ‘the NHS Commissioning Board’
(NHSCB), but just prior to its formal establishment this was changed
to NHS England.
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original concern with being ‘called to account’ by some
legitimate authority, to incorporate a multitude of add-
itional concepts such as internal notions of personal
responsibility and professional accountability to peers.
Ryan and Walsh9 argue that, driven by the so-called ‘new
public management’ approach,10 accountability in the
public sector is particularly complex, with actors in
public sector organisations being potentially accountable
to multiple audiences, including an informed public as
well as to ministers. In order to make sense of this com-
plexity, in this article, we will use the deﬁnition sug-
gested by Bovens11: ‘(accountability is) a relationship
between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an
obligation to explain his or her conduct, the forum can
pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may
face consequences’. This deﬁnition brings into focus the
notion of authority, alongside the potential for judge-
ment and sanctions. However, it leaves open the cur-
rency of accountability: for what aspects of his/her
‘conduct’ must an actor answer? A number of authors
have addressed this question.12–14 Leat15offers a fourfold
classiﬁcation: ﬁscal accountability, focusing on expend-
iture and ﬁnancial probity; process accountability,
exploring the adequacy of procedures for decision-
making; accountability for priorities, providing justiﬁca-
tion for the way in which an organisation has focused its
activities; and programme accountability, by which an
actor is held to account for the outcomes of their activ-
ity. Turning to the question of sanctions, Brinkerhoff12
sketches the idea of a spectrum, from accountability as
the provision of information about an organisation’s
actions at one end, through the additional requirement
to justify those actions, to a sanction-backed formal
‘answerability’, in which different types of sanctions may
be enforced in order to ensure compliance at the other.
This provides a useful lens through which to consider
the strength of any particular accountability relationship.
Accountability thus deﬁned encompasses what Day
and Klein16 call ‘managerial accountability’; that is,
accountability as a largely technical process, by which
those with delegated authority are held to account
against clearly speciﬁed criteria, agreed in advance, and
‘political accountability’, by which those with delegated
authority are answerable for their actions to the public.
In this latter form of accountability, the criteria for
judgement are themselves subject to debate, and it is
characterised by reasons, justiﬁcation and explanations
of behaviour (ibid, p.26), rather than by technical assess-
ment against speciﬁed criteria. Such accountability is
rarely backed by any form of sanctions other than the
possibility that those involved might be subject to a
democratic process or public opprobrium. In the real
world, simple separation between these two forms of
accountability rarely exists, (ibid, p.28), but the distinc-
tion remains analytically useful, as it provides a frame-
work within which to think about public accountability,
which is rarely tied to speciﬁc performance criteria
(unlike managerial accountability). Furthermore,
political accountability carries the possibility that moral
and ethical dimensions of performance might be incor-
porated into the accountability framework.
Taking these deﬁnitions together, ﬁve key questions
emerge, which were addressed in this study. These are
set out in box 1.
Role and functions of CCGs
Since the introduction of the quasi-market into the NHS
there has been an ambition to involve frontline primary
care physicians more closely in purchasing care for their
patients. Examples include: GP fundholding, total pur-
chasing pilots, GP Commissioning Groups, primary care
groups and practice-based commissioning.17 Each of
these previous attempts at involving clinicians in commis-
sioning shares one thing: alongside the clinical group
there existed an administrative body (initially the Health
Authority, latterly the PCT) to take statutory and ﬁnancial
responsibility. Under the HSCA 2012, no such administra-
tive support exists, with CCGs taking on full statutory
responsibility from April 2013. From this date, CCGs have
been responsible for planning, agreeing, procuring and
monitoring a full range of services for their populations.
The exact distribution of commissioning responsibilities
between CCGs and other new bodies, such as NHSE, is
complex, but essentially CCGs are responsible for most
elective, urgent and community care.18 In addition, they
are responsible for improving the quality of primary care
services, and are under a duty to work cooperatively with
the LA.19 Finally, they are under a duty to break even
ﬁnancially, and carry responsibility for ensuring that they
meet their obligations with regard to safeguarding chil-
dren and other general duties such as complying with
equalities legislation.
METHODS
The study took place between September 2011 and June
2012. Data collection involved in-depth case studies in
eight emerging CCGs,ii and national web surveys carried
out at two points in time (December 2011 and April
Box 1 Key questions about accountability
▸ To whom are these actors accountable?
▸ For what are they accountable?
▸ What sanctions may apply?
▸ What enforcement mechanisms exist?
▸ Is this accountability managerial (with clear criteria for judge-
ment) or political (involving justification and argument)?
iiCCGs are not formally established until they have been through the
authorisation process. At the time of this research, CCGs were
technically subcommittees of their local PCT, and should properly be
referred to as ‘emerging’, ‘aspirant’ or ‘Pathﬁnder’ CCGs. However, in
order to make the paper more readable, the term ‘emerging’ is
omitted, using the shorthand of ‘CCG’ to refer to the groups putting
themselves forward for authorisation.
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2012). In this article, we focus on the results from the
qualitative case studies. For a full description of the
methods see Checkland et al.20
The eight case study sites were selected to provide
maximum variety across a number of characteristics,
including size, the homogeneity of the sociodemo-
graphic proﬁle of the site and the complexity of the
local health economy and local government institutions
(table 1).
The smallest sites covered a population of 88 000–
138 000, while the largest were responsible for a popula-
tion of >500 000. Data collection involved observation of
a wide variety of different types of meetings, semistruc-
tured interviews and analysis of available documents such
as meeting minutes, strategy plans and draft constitu-
tions. In total, we observed 439 h of meetings and carried
out 96 interviews (see table 2). Meetings included, for
example, CCG governing body meetings, working group
meetings and meetings of the local HWB.
Interviews were recorded and transcribed, and
detailed contemporaneous ﬁeldnotes were written in
meetings. These data sources were analysed alongside
available documents (including those produced locally
and guidance issued by the DH/NHSCB) supported by
the qualitative data analysis software Atlas ti. We also
examined available constitutional documents for our
case study sites.
In this article, the analysis focused on the ways in
which the ideas of accountability surfaced in all of the
data sources, looking to answer the following questions:
▸ To whom are developing CCGs formally accountable,
and to whom do they regard themselves as being
accountable?
▸ For what aspects of their performance do they expect
to provide an account to each stakeholder?
▸ What sanctions might apply?
▸ What (if any) potential conﬂicts or problems can be
identiﬁed in the new system?
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In the following section, the results from the study will
be presented. We identiﬁed two main forms of account-
ability relationships of concern to the groups: account-
ability to external groups and internal accountability.
External accountability
Relationship with NHSE
NHSE provided a ‘model constitution framework’,21
which CCGs were encouraged to adapt for their own
purposes. This makes it clear that CCGs are formally
accountable to NHSE and to the Secretary of State for
Health22:
The group will (1) comply with all relevant regulations;
(2) comply with directions issued by the Secretary of State
for Health or the NHSCB; and (3) take account, as appro-
priate, of documents issued by the NHSCB (NHSE).21
The ‘regulations’ referred to are pieces of secondary
legislation. The potential accountabilities here are broad
and as yet undeﬁned. In addition to general duties
(such as a duty to promote integration, a duty to involve
the public) ﬁrst set out in earlier documents,18 the
model constitution sets out some speciﬁc ﬁnancial
duties, including the need to maintain expenditure
within agreed limits, the duty to ‘take account’ of direc-
tions issued by NHSE and the requirement to ‘publish
an account’ of how additional payments had been spent
(ref. 21, para 5.3).
As well as this essentially ﬁscal accountability, CCGs
are also accountable for the outcomes, set out in the
form of a new ‘Clinical Commissioning Group
Table 1 Site characteristics
Site Size (quintile) Sociodemographic profile and area Major providers Local authorities
1 3 Mixed, north 1 >1
2 5 Relatively homogeneous, pockets of deprivation, north >1 1
3 5 Relatively homogeneous, affluent, pockets of deprivation, south >1 >1
4 2 Relatively homogeneous, deprived, north east >1 1
5 3 Relatively homogeneous, deprived, midlands 1 >1
6 2 Relatively homogeneous, affluent, south 1 1
7 4 Mixed, south >1 1
8 4 Mixed, northwest 1 1
Table 2 Interviews
Type of respondent
Number
interviewed
Number of
interviews (some
interviewed twice)
Managers (NHS) 47 49
GPs 33 36
Lay members 5 5
Practice managers 3 3
Nurse (clinical lead) 1 1
Others (eg, Trust
manager)
1 1
Local authority
representatives
1 1
Total 91 96
GP, general practitioner; NHS, National Health Service.
4 Checkland K, Allen P, Coleman A, et al. BMJ Open 2013;3:e003769. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2013-003769
Open Access
 group.bmj.com on February 25, 2014 - Published by bmjopen.bmj.comDownloaded from 
Outcomes Indicator Set’ (CCGOIS). This was ﬁrst
mooted in the White paper, ‘Equity and Excellence:
Liberating the NHS’:
A new NHS Outcomes Framework will provide direction
for the NHS. It will include a focused set of national
outcome goals determined by the Secretary of State,
against which the NHSCB 9NHSE will be held to
account, alongside overall improvements in the NHS. In
turn, the NHS Outcomes Framework will be translated
into a commissioning outcomes framework for GP con-
sortia, to create powerful incentives for effective commis-
sioning (ref. 1, p.22).
The indicators that have been published so far vary in
scope, from those focused on reducing mortality to
those requiring the provision of particular services, such
as ensuring patients with a stroke have a visit from a spe-
cialist nurse (http://www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/cof/
cof.jsp). Guidance issued in December 201223 suggests
that, in addition to a payment for meeting target thresh-
olds on these indicators, what Leat15 calls ‘programme
accountability’ for these outcomes will form part of
NHSE’s overall annual assessment of CCG performance.
The ﬁrst hurdle for CCGs to pass was the requirement
to be ‘authorised’ by NHSE. This process involved the
submission of evidence by CCGs under six ‘domains’
relating to a strong clinical and professional focus,
patient and public engagement, good governance
arrangements, collaboration and good leadership.
Those CCGs not deemed ready for full authorisation
were initially ‘authorised with conditions’. While public
comments by the then Secretary of State for Health
Andrew Lansley initially implied that such conditions
would be minimal or rare,24 in practice, only 43 of 211
CCGs achieved authorisation without conditions, 158
had conditions imposed and 10 had signiﬁcant condi-
tions backed by legal directions.
Once authorised, the guidance states:
Annual assessment: once authorised (with or without
conditions), each CCG is subject to an annual assess-
ment. This will consider how well a CCG has performed
its functions in that year, and as part of that assessment,
determine the nature of support or conditions going
forward, based on its performance and other aspects of
its organisational capabilities and relationships, and will
enable the continued development of CCGs (ref. 25,
p.11).
The requirements against which this ‘assessment’ will
be made have not yet been set out, although it seems
likely that the CCGOIS will be involved.26
It is thus clear that CCGs will be held accountable by
NHSE, and that this will be backed up by sanctions,
including loss of ability to function as an autonomous
statutory body, and loss of income (the ‘quality
premium’ will be tied to performance against the
CCGOIS). The accountability implied here is a manager-
ial one, backed up by explicit performance measures.
We found that this signiﬁcant formal (and sanction-
backed) accountability to NHSE was recognised in the
draft constitutions under development in our case study
sites, with most carrying unchanged the language pro-
vided by the model documents. However, those involved
with setting up CCGs in our case study sites did not
seem to have appreciated either the extent of these obli-
gations or their potential impact. Indeed, across 439 h
of observation and 96 interviews, there were only three
references to ‘being held to account’ by NHSE, and
‘accountability’ of all sorts was hardly mentioned either
in the meetings which we observed. Furthermore,
although it was known that there would be an ‘outcomes
framework’, this was also rarely mentioned. It may be
that this was in part a function of the timing of our data
collection, which took place before NHSE was formally
constituted and before the draft CCGOIS was published.
However, it still seems worthy of remark that the dis-
course within our case study CCGs showed little appar-
ent recognition of the extent of the external
accountability regime to which they will be subjected to.
When accountability to the wider NHS was discussed,
the most common type of accountability mentioned was
ﬁscal accountability. Furthermore, in response to an
open-ended question in our second web-based survey
(followed up in subsequent telephone interviews) about
their ongoing relationship with NHSE, by far the largest
category of responses were those calling for NHSE to
give CCGs freedom, imposing few burdens such as
reporting requirements, targets or other forms of per-
formance management.
Accountability to the public
Clause 4.5 of the model draft constitution provided by
NHSE is headed ‘accountability’. It appears to construe
this largely in the relatively weak sense of transparency,
listing a series of mechanisms the CCG will use to ‘dem-
onstrate accountability’:
4.5.1. The group will demonstrate its accountability to its
members, local people, stakeholders and the NHSCB
(NHSE) in a number of ways, including by:
A. Publishing its constitution;
B. Appointing independent lay members and non-GP clini-
cians to the group’s governing body;
C. Holding meetings of the group’s governing body in
public (except where the group considers that it would
not be in the public interest in relation to all or part of
a meeting);
D. Publishing annually a commissioning plan;
E. Complying with local authority health overview and scru-
tiny (O&S) requirements;
F. Meeting annually in public to publish and present its
annual report;
G. Producing annual accounts with respect to each ﬁnan-
cial year which must be externally audited;
H. Having a published and clear complaints process;
I. Complying with the Freedom of Information Act 2000;
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J. Providing information to NHSE as required;
K. Publishing the group’s principal commissioning and
operational policies.
Most of our case study CCGs adopted this clause as it
stands for their constitutions, although two sites omitted
clause K.
In contrast to the relative silence about their future
relationship with NHSE, our case study CCGs appeared
keenly aware of the need to be accountable to their
patients and the public. This GP expressed this clearly:
I think what we haven’t done yet and what we’re trying to
organise now…is go one step further and recognise that
we are after all accountable to the public, we’re there to
serve them, we are paid by them, we’re there to provide
their health needs [GP ID 200]
The same GP went on to describe a pilot programme
to engage local people in discussions about service
developments, arguing that setting up robust mechan-
isms would in some way protect them against the centra-
lising tendencies of NHSE:
‘that will give true public accountability to the CCGs and
Health and Wellbeing Boards and I think it will be very
hard for agencies like [NHS England] to argue against it
if the public back it. So I think that counteracts the fear
of centralisation in the new reforms. [GP ID 200]
Mechanisms for ensuring accountability to the public
were in the early stages of development at the time of
our data collection. Holding meetings in public was
seen as important, but there were some concerns. One
site had set up these meetings with the opportunity for
the public to ask questions only at the beginning of the
meeting, rather than at the end when they might have
been able to respond to what they had heard. In an
interview we were told:
I don’t know why they’ve set it up this way to be honest.
I haven’t been involved in that, so I don’t know what the
rationale is. I’ve got a feeling that was how the PCT used
to operate, but I might be wrong. I mean I think if we’re
trying to engage with our public, but only allow them to
speak at the beginning, before we’ve actually said any-
thing…it does rather go against the ethos, I think
[Manager ID 122]
There was a general awareness that meeting in public
alone will not ensure true public accountability, and all
of our study site CCGs were intending to set up add-
itional forums for patients and the public to become
involved with the work of the CCG, including patient
forums, community involvement groups, public events
and the publication of newsletters. They thus showed a
signiﬁcant rhetorical commitment to the essentially pol-
itical accountability represented by the so-called ‘public
accountability’, but, at the time of data collection,
arrangements to put this in practice were rudimentary
and did not yet differ signiﬁcantly than those set up by
their predecessor organisations, PCTs.
CCGs are also required to have at least two lay members
in their governing body.27 In practice, those appointed as
‘lay’ members in our case study sites tended to be people
with past NHS experience, with ex-non-executive directors
of PCTs a popular choice. PCTs were required to have a
majority of non-executive directors, so that the executive
directors could be outvoted if necessary. This will not be
the case in CCGs, suggesting that, on paper at least, the
‘public’ voice within CCGs’ governing bodies will be less
powerful than it has been in the past NHS commissioning
bodies. We saw no clear differences in attitude or approach
between the lay members and the professional members
of governing bodies.
In addition to these CCG-led approaches to public
accountability, the HSCA 2012 establishes new bodies
called local Healthwatch.1 These organisations did not
exist at the time of our data collection, but ofﬁcial docu-
ments suggest that they will be expected to scrutinise
CCGs’ performance and hold them to account in some
way, although the mechanisms by which this will take
place are far from clear.
Other external accountabilities
CCGs also have some external accountability to other
organisations. These include the economic regulator,
Monitor (responsible for ensuring that CCGs adhere to
competition rules); HWBs; LA O&S committee (OSC);
and the Local Medical Committee (LMC). The LMC is
the local representative body for GPs. Members are
elected from the local GP population, and, historically,
LMCs have played a role in negotiating with PCTs on
behalf of GPs in their role as providers of services.
Monitor
Under the HSCA 2012, Monitor is the economic regula-
tor of the whole NHS system, including promoting com-
petition between providers of care. It is empowered to
require CCGs to account for their behaviour with
respect to procurement, and this accountability will be
formally backed up by the sanctions of competition law.
At the same time, Monitor is required to promote the
integration and cooperation between providers of health
services (HSCA 2012 section 66). It remains to be seen
how these apparently conﬂicting responsibilities will play
out. At the time of our ﬁeldwork, the future role of
Monitor impinged little on our case study sites. This is
not surprising, as at this time, the details of how
Monitor’s future role will operate are not yet fully devel-
oped at the national level.
Accountability relationships with the LA
HWBs are new LA bodies which are responsible for
setting the strategic direction for health and social care,
leading to the formal assessment of local needs. These
are in differing states of development across the country,
and, at the time of data collection, it was unclear how
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the mutual ‘holding to account’ between HWBs and
CCGs would operate in future. HWBs are responsible
for developing the annual Joint Strategic Needs
Assessment (JSNA), and CCGs are required to ‘take
account’ of this in developing their own strategic plans.
CCGs have representatives on their local HWBs, and will
therefore be party to the JSNA development. Should the
HWB consider that the CCGs plans do not ﬁt within it,
they will be able to ask the CCG to ‘provide an account’
to explain why this is the case. However, no sanctions
exist should the CCG continue to disregard the HWB.
While it remains early days, our study found evidence of
two approaches to this developing relationship.28 In
some sites, the CCGs appeared to see themselves as an
integral and important part of the development of the
HWB, seeing themselves as ‘co-owners’ of the HWB with
the LA. In other areas, we saw HWBs developing separ-
ately, with the CCG representatives present at meetings
but apparently seeing themselves as representing the
CCG rather than as partners in the HWB process. It
remains to be seen how these differing approaches
develop over time, and how HWBs will react should
CCGs decide to disregard their concerns.
The other key LA accountability mechanism is via the
Overview and Scrutiny (O&S) process. Historically,
Overview and Scrutiny Committees (OSCs) were empow-
ered to examine any ‘signiﬁcant’ changes to local ser-
vices, requiring relevant NHS senior managers to attend
and explain their plans. Should the committee be
unconvinced, they had the power to refer the proposed
change to the Secretary of State for Health. It was ini-
tially proposed that this scrutiny function would be
assumed by HWBs, but after some debate, it was decided
that LAs should retain it as a separate function.29
However, considerable uncertainties remain as to how
this will function in practice.19 Given the early stages of
development of the new structures, it is not surprising
that the majority of respondents in our case study sites
were as yet little concerned with their obligations to
account for themselves before the local OSC. This
manager expressed some scepticism:
To be honest with you, I didn’t really understand why we
were held to account by the OSC because…especially if
they don’t understand the area of work that we’re talking
about. If you go in and talk about diagnostics and how
we’re going to reconﬁgure that in the health economy,
really, they wouldn’t really know what…so I think it’s…I
think it’s useful for some things, the joint initiatives
like…like the stability, transport and all those sort of
things that kind of have a cross-cutting effect, but I’m not
really sure that it’s useful for the speciﬁc health issues.
[manager ID 152]
Others were more positive, describing the O&S
process as ‘helpful’ in the past in reﬁning and develop-
ing plans.
Local Medical Committees
Finally, many of our CCGs were keen to include their
LMC in discussions of their development plans. LMCs
have no formal role in CCG development, but those we
studied were aware that antagonising the LMC could
carry signiﬁcant consequences in terms of member
engagement. Many utilised the LMC to organise the
elections to their board, and continued to liaise and
consult with the group. In one site, we witnessed a long
discussion about the future relationship between the
CCG and the local LMC. The LMC had requested
regular formal meetings with the CCG governing body,
but the CCG resisted this, agreeing that they should
engage, but suggesting that frequent meetings would be
unnecessarily burdensome. The CCG lay member com-
mented: ‘now you (as GPs) are directly responsible, you
are the accountable body and the LMC have no role to
hold you to account’. Another group included this
clause in their constitution:
The LMC
3.6.1 The CCG recognises [local] Local Medical
Committee as the statutory representative body of
general practice for provider purposes in relation to local
primary care contracts. There will also be full observer
status for the LMC on the CCG Governing Body and the
Chair of the CCG will regularly attend meetings of the
LMC by invitation to provide updates, brieﬁngs and
respond to individual areas of concern. Other opportun-
ities for engagement (such as Locality Link Members)
will be set out in the member practice engagement strat-
egy. The LMC also plays an important role in independ-
ently running the election process for Locality GP
representation.’
Overlapping accountabilities
It is thus clear that CCGs are subject to a wide range of
external accountabilities. The most clearly developed of
these is the sanction-backed accountability to NHSE, but
it is also clear that a wide range of other bodies feel that
they have a role. The extent of these external account-
abilities was experienced as problematic at times, with
one manager commenting:
…there’s people in the rest of the NHS are trying to work
out what their roles are. You know, I have had four
demands this week from different places for a slightly dif-
ferent perspective report on the same topic, and not just a
report but then turn up and tell them and assure them
you’re doing something about it. And that’s just on the
one topic. That’s the world we’re living in. And while
you’re satisfying that world, it’s very difﬁcult to focus on
what your organisation should be doing. [manger ID 173]
Internal accountability
CCGs are membership organisations, and this is said to
be one of the key strengths of the new structures.30 As
such, there is a two-way accountability relationship
between the CCG governing body and the general
Checkland K, Allen P, Coleman A, et al. BMJ Open 2013;3:e003769. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2013-003769 7
Open Access
 group.bmj.com on February 25, 2014 - Published by bmjopen.bmj.comDownloaded from 
practices who are members, as well as accountabilities
between the various working groups within the CCG.
Members’ accountability to the CCG
The CCGs in our study were clear that their practice
members would be in an accountability relationship with
the CCG, and this relationship was one in which the
CCG would ‘hold General Practices to account’ for their
behaviour, including such things as referral practices
and prescribing. This manager described it thus:
Q: What would you claim to be the early success of a
CCG? I mean you, how would you see it?
A: That’s a very good question [laughter]. I think… one
of things it has done is it has got more GPs involved and
more GPs talking to one another and looking at their
referral patterns and realising that…they are accountable
rather than it maybe just being one person for a practice
being the person who goes to this meeting, comes back
and everybody goes oh, well that’s ﬁne and just ignores
it. I think there is certainly an additional…almost
accountability, a buy in from more GPs across the patch.
[Manager ID 254]
In many sites the relationship between general prac-
tices and the wider group is governed by a written agree-
ment, called an ‘accountability’ or ‘membership’
agreement:
If you’re working as a CCG and you’ve…signed up to
your accountability agreement and everyone’s in it
together, you can’t have some General Practices over-
spending ridiculously and some desperately trying to
make savings. You know, that’s not…I don’t think that’s
on. [GP ID 37]
These agreements were usually developed in addition
to the CCG constitution, and set out mutual obligations
within the group. Thus, for example, in site 3 the ‘mem-
bership agreement’ forms an appendix to the formal
constitution of the group. It sets out what the CCG will
provide for general practices (such as the provision of
timely information, educational events and prescribing
support) and stipulates the following practice
obligations:
▸ To share named information by practice for peer
review;
▸ To actively participate in demand management using
speciﬁed tools;
▸ To actively communicate with other members, the
locality and the CCG as a whole;
▸ To develop a framework for quality within the
practice;
▸ To agree and sign up to the terms of the
Constitution;
▸ If any member practice fails to meet agreed targets,
they agree to work on and implement a development
plan;
▸ To provide a practice patient representative for the
patient and public engagement body;
▸ To name a practice lead for clinical commissioning;
▸ To work on and implement care closer to home
pathways;
▸ To actively manage the devolved budget to assist
ﬁnancial balance and quality, innovation, productivity
and prevention (QIPP);
▸ To support robust and effective clinical, ﬁnancial and
operational risk management across the CCG (extract
from membership agreement site 3).
Such agreements suggest a degree of voluntarism, by
which general practices are ceding some sovereignty to
the wider group, in return for receiving support and
access to the resources of the group. However, CCG
membership is compulsory for all general practices in
England, so this voluntarism is in practice somewhat
illusory.
A membership agreement had been drawn up (see asso-
ciated documents). This has to be signed by all GPs. [GP
lead] asked how best to go about this. He also pointed
out that this agreement is not a legally binding docu-
ment. After some discussion it was agreed to send out
the document to practice managers and ask them to
oversee the process and [manager] was asked to follow
up those that did not return the signed agreement. [par-
ticipant] asked if they should plan for those who refuse
to sign. [GP lead] said: there is no choice! [Extract from
ﬁeldnotes, Locality meeting ID M54]
It also remains unclear what sanctions might apply,
should general practices break the terms of these agree-
ments. One CCG constitution suggests that general prac-
tices failing to keep to the agreement would have to
‘give an account’ ﬁrst to their local peers, and subse-
quently to the CCG board, but no sanctions and time-
scales are speciﬁed. Such agreements must walk a ﬁne
line, as performance management of GPs with respect
to their clinical practice will be the responsibility of
NHSE, and there has been national concern to ensure
that CCGs do not stray into this aspect of practice.31
Accountability to members
The formal accountability of the CCG to its constituent
members is mainly promulgated through the account-
ability of its governing body to the members and of the
speciﬁc ofﬁcers of the CCG (being the Chair,
Accountable Ofﬁcer (AO) and Chief Financial Ofﬁcer)
to the CCG. One aspect of accountability is the ability to
dismiss those who do not perform well. The general prin-
ciple for CCGs is that members elect their governing
body and chair for time limited terms, but the model
constitution does not specify exactly how the governing
body, ofﬁcers and committees should be elected and dis-
missed, and there is some variation in how this has been
arranged in the constitutions adopted in the study sites.
The governing body is accountable to the members for
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the running of the CCG in accordance with its constitu-
tion. Clause 7.3.1. of the model constitution explains how
‘each member of the governing body should share
responsibility as part of a team to ensure that the group
exercises its functions effectively, efﬁciently and econom-
ically, with good governance and in accordance with the
terms of this constitution’
The ofﬁcers of the CCG are also accountable to the
governing body of the CCG, and through that to the
CCG membership. Each CCG’s draft constitution sets
out its own requirements for appointment and removal.
For example, the chair in one site must be a ‘provider of
primary medical services’ who is elected by ‘qualifying
providers of primary medical services’. There is a 2-year
to 4-year term, renewable to a maximum of 10 years.
Some of the constitutions state circumstances in which
the chair would be obliged to stand down, for example,
in another site, if the chair
‘has behaved in a manner or exhibited conduct which
has or is likely to be detrimental to the reputation and
interest of the group and is likely to bring the group into
disrepute. This includes but is not limited to dishonesty,
misrepresentation (either knowingly or fraudulently),
defamation of any member of the governing body, abuse
of position, non declaration of a known conﬂict of inter-
est, seeking to lead or manipulate a decision of the gov-
erning body in a manner that would ultimately be in
favour of that person whether ﬁnancially or otherwise;’
As might be expected as CCGs were in the process of
establishing themselves, we witnessed a considerable dis-
cussion about these internal governance issues within
the groups. In meetings and in interviews comments
were made about the following accountabilities:
▸ The CCG governing body is accountable to the
members;
▸ Locality groups are accountable to the governing body;
▸ Subcommittees are accountable to the governing body;
▸ Employed ofﬁcers are accountable to the governing
body.
▸ Elected governing body members are accountable to
the membership.
However, such discussions rarely included any
mention of either the mechanisms by which such
accountabilities would be promulgated, or the sanctions
that might apply. In practice, our ﬁndings suggest that
the main mechanism by which these accountabilities will
be enforced is by information sharing and transparency,
with governing bodies receiving reports from sub groups
and localities, and in turn reporting on their activities to
assemblies of members. This would seem to be a form
of political accountability, with the respective groups
making an argument and providing justiﬁcations for
their actions, with no explicit performance measures
and few available sanctions. The only area in which
there would seem to be some possible formal sanctions
is in the election/selection of ofﬁcers such as Chair and
AO, as discussed above. It is also conceivable that a CCG
governing body which had lost the conﬁdence of its
membership might ﬁnd that general practices informally
withdrew their cooperation; whether the governing body
could use its authority to prevent this is unclear.
SUMMARY
Our study shows that CCGs are subject to a complex web
of accountability relationships. The strongest form of
accountability would seem to be their accountability to
NHSE, backed by sanctions and subject to annual assess-
ment. Furthermore, the currency of this accountability is
clearly established, encompassing ﬁscal accountability and
programme accountability for the CCGOIS. The account-
ability to other external bodies such as HWB is, by con-
trast, much weaker, and less clearly deﬁned, with CCGs
required to ‘give an account’, with no associated sanc-
tions. Accountability to Monitor may be more formal, as it
would seem that Monitor will be empowered to enforce
competition law, although how this will operate in practice
is as yet unclear. Accountability to the public is a political
accountability, focused on the relatively weak notion of
‘transparency’, with no associated sanctions. Internal
accountability is similarly complex, with a mix of mutual
and one-way relationships, some accompanied by the
ultimate sanction of voting out ofﬁce holders. General
practices are said to be ‘held to account’ if they transgress
the rules of the group, but it is unclear as yet if they could
be ejected, as all general practices must be a member of a
CCG. These external accountabilities can be summarised
in diagrammatic form (ﬁgure 1).
Internal accountability relationships are similarly
complex. Figure 2 summarises these, distinguishing
between those bodies within CCGs which will hold each
other to account and those which are accountable.
Figure 1 Clinical commissioning group external
accountabilities. CCG, clinical commissioning group; DH,
department of health; HWB, Health and Well-being Board; LA
OSC, local authority overview and scrutiny committee; LMC,
local medical committee; NHS, National Health Service.
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DISCUSSION
Principal findings and their implications
The HSCA 2012 promised ‘increased accountability’ as
justiﬁcation for the wide ranging NHS reforms in
England. Our study suggests that CCGs will indeed be
‘more accountable’ than their predecessor organisations
(PCTs) in the sense that they will be accountable to a
much wider range of organisations and bodies of
people. Indeed, we have shown that CCGs are at the
centre of a complex web of accountability relationships,
both internal and external. However, whether this trans-
lates into being more responsive, or more easily held to
account, remains to be seen.
In general, studies suggest that complex accountabil-
ity arrangements tend to generate confusion,32 and
that, where organisations are accountable to multiple
audiences, the interests of those audiences may differ,
generating unintended consequences.33 This may be
important for CCGs, as they attempt to balance the
demands of the multiple audiences to whom they are
being asked to account. We have shown that, as things
stand, the accountability relationship with NHSE is the
only one in which the currency and focus of account-
ability is clearly set out, although even this managerial
accountability remains untested. However, our study
participants also showed a keen commitment to other,
more political forms of accountability, and it is possible
that in future, CCGs will choose to satisfy their public
audiences rather than NHSE or the DH. Thus, for
example, NHSE has suggested that CCGs’ closeness to
their members and their responsibility to account to
local politicians via HWBs will make it easier to make
difﬁcult decisions about service reconﬁgurations34 but
it is equally likely that CCGs accountable to local politi-
cians and to local people via daily contacts in their sur-
geries will avoid such hard decisions in the face of
public opposition. This latter interpretation is perhaps
supported by evidence from other ﬁelds where such
direct local accountability exists. Thus, for example, the
introduction of directly elected Police and Crime
Commissioners in the UK raised fears that the need to
satisfy a local electorate may lead to a short-term focus
on retaining popularity, rather than a longer term
focus on strategic needs.35
Strengths and weaknesses
This study took place during the early phases of CCG
establishment, and therefore provides a snap shot of a
developing situation. However, the data collected were
wide and deep, and the ﬁndings therefore provide a
robust picture of the developing landscape of CCG
accountability.
Comparison with previous studies
It is instructive to compare CCGs with their predecessor
organisations, PCTs. PCTs were straightforwardly
accountable (via a managerial accountability regime,
backed by the sanction that senior individuals could lose
their jobs) to their local Strategic Health Authority, who
were, in turn, accountable to the Secretary of State. In
addition, they had a duty to account to patients and the
public, consulting them and providing information
about their decisions. In practice, the strong account-
ability backed by personal sanctions for the senior
executives drove the agenda, with studies highlighting
the clear distinction between ‘must do’ actions, where
one’s job could be at risk, versus those which could be
negotiated or modiﬁed.36 The potential distorting effect
of this type of strong accountability has been well docu-
mented,37 and PCTs were generally held to be poorly
accountable to their local populations.38 Senior staff in
CCGs do not appear at present to be subject to personal
sanctions in quite such an immediate way, and it will be
interesting to explore over the coming months whether
the threat of organisational sanctions will act to drive
the agenda in a similar way. It also remains to be seen
how far the early rhetorical commitment to public
accountability that we found translates into meaningful
activity.
It is too early for there to be any published empirical
study of CCG accountability, although some commentar-
ies have been published. In the most comprehensive of
these, writing from a legal perspective, Davies39 argues
that the complex additional accountabilities to which
CCGs are subject may, in practice, act to dilute the
important central accountability to parliament that the
act is ostensibly designed to promote.
Unanswered questions
CCGs are responsible for signiﬁcant amounts of public
money, and it is important that they are subject to scru-
tiny as they develop their new ways of working. This
study provides an early look on their developing
accountability relationships, and highlights the complex-
ity and potential problems which may arise. It is vital
that further work follows these ﬁnding up and explores
in depth the way in which the complex relationships
identiﬁed here play out in practice over time. Ultimately,
the extent to which CCGs are felt to be truly account-
able for their work will be an important aspect of any
Figure 2 Clinical commissioning group internal
accountabilities. CCG, clinical commissioning group.
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overall judgement about the success of this signiﬁcant
reform programme.
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